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Abstract: Overly strict legal standards are commonly thought to discourage parties from 
engaging in socially desirable activities.  It is explained here, however, that excessive 
legal standards cannot lead to undesirable curtailment of activities when legal standards 
are enforced by liability for negligence, essentially because parties can choose to be 
negligent rather than comply.  But excessive legal standards can lead to undesirable 
reduction of activities when adherence to the standards is required by the regulatory 
system. 
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1. Introduction 
  The question addressed in this note is whether overly strict legal standards tend to 
discourage parties from engaging in socially desirable activities.  By legal standards, I 
refer generally to standards of precaution, investment in safety, and the like that must be 
met to avoid liability for negligence,
1 as well as to regulatory standards that must be 
satisfied in order to participate in regulated activities.
2  It seems to be a commonplace 
notion that unduly rigorous legal requirements may lead to too little socially beneficial 
activity, for instance, that excessive environmental standards can exert a disadvantageous 
chilling effect on business activity or that excessive duties of care can cause physicians to 
exit from socially desirable areas of medical practice.
3  
Perhaps surprisingly, the answer that is reached here is that inappropriately 
stringent legal standards cannot lead to socially undesirable discouragement of 
participation in activities when legal standards are enforced by liability for negligence.  
But excessive legal standards can lead to undesirable curtailment of activities when 
adherence to the standards is required by the regulatory system. 
  To explain, under the liability system, a party will be found negligent, and bear 
liability for any harm that it causes, if it fails to comply with a legal standard.  As a 
consequence, if a legal standard is set too high (say the standard for investment in 
pollution control devices is more expensive than justified by the reduction in pollution-
related harm that the devices accomplish), a party may well be led to satisfy the excessive 
standard in order to avoid liability for negligence.  If so, just because the party will not be 
found negligent and not have to pay for harm that it causes, the party can be shown to 
participate to too great an extent in its activity, not too little.
4  It is possible, though, that a 
legal standard will be set so high that a party will decide not to meet the standard (the 
called-for but unjustified pollution control devices are so expensive that they are not 
purchased) and thus will be held liable for negligence and have to pay for harm done.  
Yet in this case, the party will be led to take optimal (rather than excessive) precautions 
and to participate optimally in its activity, because it will pay for the harm that it causes.  
In sum, although parties may be led to take excessive precautions by excessive legal 
standards, they are never led to participate too little in their activities, and they might 
participate too much.  
                                                 
1 The major basis of liability for harm in our legal system is liability for negligence, that is, failing 
to meet a legal standard; see, for example, Dobbs (2000), chapters 6, 11, and 23. 
  
2 For a general desciption of regulation, see, for example, Viscusi, Harrington, and Vernon (2005).  
 
3 This is one of the themes advanced in, for instance, Huber and Litan (1991).  
4 In Shavell (1980), I emphasized the general point that if parties obey a legal standard and thus 
avoid negligence liability, they do not pay for the harm they cause and thus tend to engage in activities to a 
socially excessive extent.  However, I did not consider behavior under excessive legal standards or compare 
participation in activities under liability and under regulation. 
 
  1Under regulation, in contrast, there can be an undesirable chilling effect on 
participation in a regulated activity, assuming that parties are forced to comply with the 
legal standard in order to engage in the activity.  If the legal standard is sufficiently 
burdensome, it will discourage some socially desirable participation in the activity.   
The difference between the regulatory context and the negligence liability context 
is that only in the latter context can the party facing excessive legal standards choose not 
to adhere to the standards and instead pay for harm that eventuates.   
 
2. The model 
  Let x $ 0 be the level and cost of precautions taken by risk-neutral parties when 
they engage in a potentially harmful activity, and let h(x) > 0 be the expected harm given 
x, where hN(x) < 0 and hO(x) > 0.  Let a party’s level of the activity be y $ 0.  When a 
party engages in the activity at level y, assume that it derives a profit or private benefit 
b(y) > 0, where bN(y) > 0 and bO(y) < 0.  Further, assume that the costs of precautions and 
expected harm rise in proportion to the level of activity – they equal y(x + h(x)) – the 
interpretation being that each time a party engages in the activity, it exercises precautions 
and may cause harm. 
  Suppose that social welfare equals private benefits minus the costs of precautions 
and expected harm,   
(1)     b(y) – y(x + h(x)). 
Hence, the socially optimal level of precautions, denoted x*, minimizes x + h(x).  Further, 
the socially optimal level of activity, denoted y*, is determined by the first-order 
condition
5
(2)    bN(y) = x* + h(x*), 
namely, the marginal private benefit from engaging in the activity equals the marginal 
social costs, comprised of the costs of optimal precaution and the expected harm 
generated each time the activity is undertaken. 
  Consider now liability for negligence, under which a legal standard of precautions 
is set, denoted s.  We will consider different possible standards.
6  By definition of the 
negligence rule, if a party’s level of precaution x is at least s, it will not be found 
negligent and will not be made to pay for harm caused, whereas if x is less than s, it will 
be found negligent and will thus bear h(x).  What x will a party select?  Clearly, a party 
will never choose x exceeding s, for it will escape liability by exercising merely s.  If the 
party chooses x below s, its expected expenses will be x + h(x).  Hence, it will choose s as 
long as  
(3)    s # x + h(x) for all x < s. 
It follows from (3) that a party will choose s if s in the interval [0, sm], where
7  
                                                 
5 For simplicity, I assume that y* is positive, so that (2) must hold. 
  
6 The motivation is that the court (or, below, the regulator) may not have sufficient information to 
calculate the optimal level of precaution x* and to set the legal standard s equal to it.  For my purposes, 
there is no need to consider the court’s information and its choice of s.  My interest is in determining 
parties’ behavior as a function of s. 
 
7 Since x* minimizes x + h(x) over all x, the right-hand side of (3) is greater than or equal to x* + 
h(x*) = sm.  Hence (3) must hold for s# sm. 
 
  2(4)   sm  =  x* + h(x*). 
In other words, parties will satisfy the legal standard s if it does not exceed the socially 
optimal standard x* by too much (more than h(x*)).  But if s > sm, parties will prefer to be 
negligent than to satisfy the standard: If a party is negligent, it will choose x* (as it will 
choose x to minimize x + h(x)) and bear total expenses of x* + h(x*) = sm < s.  Further, 
when s < sm, since parties choose s, their cost of participation is just s per unit, so they 
choose y to maximize 
(5)   b(y) – ys, 
and thus their y is determined by 
(6)  bN(y) = s, 
so that their choice of y is excessive; y > y*.
8  The explanation is that their cost per unit 
of activity leaves out the harm h(s), so they do not face the appropriate social cost of 
engaging in the activity.  However, if the legal standard is sufficiently excessive, at least 
sm, they will choose y* since they will then choose x* and bear h(x*).  We can summarize 
as follows. 
  Proposition 1.  Under the negligence rule, parties choose precaution x equal to the 
legal standard s if s does not exceed sm  =  x* + h(x*), namely, optimal precaution plus 
expected harm per unit of activity; but parties decide to be negligent and to choose 
optimal precaution if s exceeds sm.  Parties’ level of activity y is socially excessive (y > 
y*) if s < sm and is optimal for s at least sm.  In particular, parties’ level of activity is never 
too low. 
  Note that although any legal standard s in the interval (x*,  x* + h(x*)) is 
excessive and results in excessive precaution, it also leads to excessive levels of activity 
rather than to too little activity. 
  Now consider regulation and legal standards assuming that parties must comply 
with a legal standard in order to participate in the activity. Then, since parties who 
participate in the activity take precautions equal to s, whatever s is, their level of activity 
is determined by (6) regardless of s.  If s > sm, their activity level y will thus be too low, 
less than y*.  To be explicit, we have 
  Propostion 2. Under regulation, in which parties must meet the legal standard s, 
parties’ level of activity y is socially excessive (y > y*) if s < sm , optimal if s = sm, and 
too low if s > sm. 
  The difference between regulation and negligence liability is, as stated above, that 
when the legal standard is very high – exceeding sm – it must be satisfied under 
regulation, and hence leads to a too low level of activity, whereas under negligence  
liability, parties can and will choose to ignore the excessive standard and will behave 
optimally.  Note too that, under regulation, even when the legal standard s is high enough 
to depress the activity y to below the optimal level y*, the level of activity is still 
excessive conditional on the level of precaution s. 
 
3. Conclusion  
  The familiar notion that unduly strict legal standards undesirably curb 
participation in socially desirable activities needs to be cautiously interpreted.  There is, 
to begin with, an underlying tendency for parties to engage too much in activities under 
the negligence rule of liability and under regulation, because complying parties do not 
                                                 
8 This follows because s < sm  =  x* +  h(x*) and because bO(y) < 0.  
  3bear the harm that their activities generate.  Moreover, under liability for negligence, 
parties have the option, the escape hatch, of acting negligently rather than complying 
with a harsh legal standard.  Hence, it turns out that under negligence liability, parties 
never engage too little in their activities.
9  Under regulation, however, parties may be 
undesirably discouraged from participating in their activities if standards are excessive, 
given the assumption they must comply with the standards.  
                                                 
9 However, if the level of damages that parties pay if found negligent exceeds harm (because, for 
instance, punitive damages are imposed), the conclusion might be different.  
  4 
References 
 
Dobbs, Dan B. 2000. The Law of Torts. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group. 
 
Huber, Peter W., and Robert E. Litan, editors. 1991. The Liability Maze: The Impact of 
Liability Law on Safety and Innovation. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.  
 
Shavell, Steven. 1980. “Strict Liability versus Negligence.” Journal of Legal Studies, 
9(1), pp. 1-25.  
 
Viscusi, W. Kip, Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., and John M. Vernon. 2005. Economics of 
Regulation and Antitrust. Fourth edition. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
  5